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THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE:

1.

AN ANALYTIC 'FRAMEWORK *

Introductio n
The U.S. Government pursues a number of policies that affect

imports of oil.

An

excise tax is imposed on sales of gasoline and

the U.S.Governm ent maintains "strategic reserves" of oil in salt domes.
There has been discussion of imposing a tariff on oil both to raise
revenue and to improve the

u.s.

terms of trade.

Oil presents U.S. policy makers with a situation that is unusual
in three respects.

First, in most areas where a protectioni st policy has

been pursued by the U.S. government, the motivation has been primarily
domestic, to maintain output and employment levels in different regions
and sectors.

The second-best nature of tariffs and quotas for these

purposes is well known.

In contrast, many of the existing and proposed

policies toward oil have been justified partly on optimal tariff grounds;
the United States is a large importer whose level of imports affects the
world price.
policy.

From a national perspective ,restricting imports is a first-best

Indeed, the current level of protection may be too low.

·'le

We are grateful to Lars Svensson and Brian Wright for useful
comments and discussions on a previous version of this paper.
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Second, oil is an exhau~tible resource.

Imports in any period

affect in an essential way not only the international price today but the
world equilibrium in all future periods.

The static framework of most

trade theoretic tariff analysis is inappropriate.
Third, the strategic behavior on the part of agents other than
the U.S. government is important to the effects of policy.
thing, OPEC constitutes a large supplier.

For one

For another, U.S. policies

affect the storage and extraction behavior of private agents in the
domestic and world economies.
taken into account.
agents except the

The interactions of these groups must be

Again, a static framework which assumes that all

u.s.

government are atomistic is inappropriate.

These three considerations make an analysis of optimal commercial
policy in terms of traditional trade models difficult.

Before an

analysis of the welfare effects of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(SPR) can be attempted, an analytic framework identifying its effects on
US welfare must be specified.
analytic framework.

Our purpose here is to develop such an

The model we develop does not incorporate all aspects

of the SPR that we believe to be important.

Nevertheless, it suggests

a set of considerations that necessarily arise in a strategic setting
between a large importing country and a monopolistic supplier.
The remainder of the introduction provides a brief discussion
of the background of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and an outline
of our analysis.
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1. 1 Background
The current pattern of general public concern about energy supplies
is in sharp contras t to the pattern. which prevaile d prior to 1973.

In the

early years after World War II, the U.S. was essentia lly self-su fficient with
respect to crude oil supplie s.

Concern , largely by members of the petroleu m

industry , was focused not on problem s of shortage ··but on the price effects
of abundan ce.

As a result,t he U.S. government imposed an oil import quota

in 1959 of 9 percent of the estimate d domestic demand.

However, imports

2radual ly increase d over time and reached approxim ately 23 percent
of total domestic demand by 1972. By April 1973, import quotas were
di'iconti nued and a tariff was briefly introduc ed.

Despite the quota,

conside rable excess capacity for crude oil producti on develope d during the
sixties and regulato ry federal and state agencies distribu ted producti on
allocati ons to the various produce rs of crude petroleu m.

The real price

of oil was continuo usly dropp•ing during the sixties until October 1973.
As a response to the oil crisis of 1973 the Interna tional Energy

Agency (IEA) of the OECD establis hed the Internat ional Energy Program,
Particip ants in the program pledged to establis h reserves equal to 60
days consump tion (to increase to 90 days in 1980).

The Strateg ic

Petroleu m Reserve (SPR) program was created by the Energy Policy and
Conserv ation Act of 1975 as the U.S. component of the program . 1

Since

1977 (see Table 1) oil has been stored at five undergro und salt dome and
salt mine sites in Louisian a and Texas.

Purchase s of oil proceede d at a

rate of 21 thousand barrels per day during 1977 and 162 thousand barrels
per day during 1978 (see Table-! ).

In late 1978, however , as a conseque nce

of tight oil market conditio ns associa ted with the Iranian crisis, the
Carter Adminis tration postpone d purchase s of oil from the stockpi le.

At
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that time seven stockpilin g· nations agreed to curtail stockpilin g
acquisiti ons if such acquisitio n would "result in any pressure on the
world oil market."

(Glatt, pp. 22-23).

Conseque ntly, purchases fell

to a daily rate of 67 thousand barrels in 1979 and 44 thousand barrels
in 1980.

In 1980, however, oil market condition s slackened and

purchases resumed.

In that year Congress passed the Energy Security

Act that required that the President acquire reserves at a minimum
rate of 100 thousand barrels per day (Glatt, p. 11).

In fact,

during 1981 arid 1982 the average acquisiti on rate has far exceeded
that minimum.

An issue for the management of the stockpile is whether

or not acquisiti ons (or drawdowns) should respond to world oil market
condition s (as the IEA agreement would suggest) or procede independe ntly
· of world market condition s (as implied to some extent by the Energy
Security Act of 1980).

Our analysis sheds some light on this issue.

As of March 1982 the Reserves contained 250 millions barrels

of crude oil, while the current plan is to place 750 million barrels
of oil in storage by the end of 1989.

In most official documenta tion

the SPR is viewed as protectio n against the consequen ces of a severe
petroleum supply interrupt ion.

In somewhat different way Senator Henry

Jackson, a strong supporter of the SPR, expressed his view that " •••with
a strategic petroleum reserve, we will have greater credibili ty, as I
see it, in dealing with this problem (oil prices), and we'll help to
stabilize the price situation , which otherwise could be one of great
havoc." 2

Table

1

AVERAGE CRUDE PETROLEUM PRODUCTION, PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION AND END OF YEAR PETROLF.tTM ~'J't1r.Y.~. 1
Thousand~ of Barrels per day

1973

Total World
Productio n

World Minus
USSR and China
OPEC
Productio n
Productio n

55748

46193

30989.

1974

55910

45595

30729

1975

52552

41837

27155

1976

57405

1977

59795

45592
47239

30738
31278

I

1978

\ 60165

46898

29805

us
Productio n
!

I
I

8208

IEA 2
Consumpti on Consumpti on

us

17308

34150

8774

16653

32960

8375

16322

31870

8132

I

! 8245

17461
18431

33770
34930

Million of Barrels
Stocks
SPR 3

--

us

SPR

--

1008

---

llU :

21

1312 I Z 7

1074
1133
. !'

'

OECD
'i'
I

NA

I

--

, NA

--

i NA

--

I

''

!

NA

3152

I

1979

'. 62698

49116

30928

\ 8707
I
8552

1980

159452

45568

26890

8597

17056

33000

44

1392

108

I

1981

! 55710

41885

22665

8572

16058

31400

256

1484

230

\ 3537

1982 (March)! 51800

37980

18415

I 8597

i

18847

35880

162

18513

35900

67

1341

91

;

3358
3566

1278 ! .,1

I

I

15560

31600

182

1401

Petroleum Stocks include crude oil, unfinishe d oils, natural gas plant liquids and regined products.

2.

The Internati onal Energy Agency includes 21 t11emher n:ttions (see details in the Monthly EnerP,y Review).
Strategic Petroleum Reserves.

Source

i

r

1.

3.

l 3089

U.S. Departmen t of Energy, Monthly Energy Review, September 1982.

249

': NA

lI
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The U.S. Oil Industry requires about one billion barrels of crude oil
as minimum operating stocks which are about 60 dayd of petroleum consumption.
The current goal of the SPR would almost double the days consumption from the US
stock (Table 1).

The US is a large consumer of oil, it consumes about 36-40

...

percent of world oil production (excluding USSR and China).

OPEC produces about

50-55 percent of the world production (excluding USSR and China).

As such we

suggest that the view that the world oil market consists of one large
producer (OPEC) and one large consumer (the USA) is a reasonable first ap
proximation.

However, the effect of other (small) producers and. consumers

as well as the large local production of oil in the USA (about 60 percent
of current US consumption) should be considered in extensions of this paper.
1. 2 Outline
In section 2 we develop a simple two-period model of an oil importing
country (the USA) and an oil exporter (OPEC).
competitive equilibrium of this model.

In section 3 we examine the

We show that under certainty and in

the presence of a full set of contigent commodity markets there is no role
for inventories, not to mention government inventories, of any form.
Introducing a "convenience yield" on inventories, on the basis of their
use in f~cilitating production, provides a justification for holdings of
inventories on the part of the private sector.

In the absence of produc

tion externalities, however, there is no reason for the government to
hold inventories.

Introducing uncertainty by itself does not pro~ide an

argument in favor of US private inventories.

Uncertainty combined with the

absence of full contingent commodity markets or US property rights in OPEC

7

does imply a role for inven torie s as a form of portf
olio dive rsific ation
on the part of the USA.

Priva te agen ts, howe ver, have an incen tive to

hold inven torie s at the level that maxim izes expec
ted US natio nal welfa re.
In the absen ce of exte rnali ties, then, we can find
no argum ent in favor
of US gover nmen t inven torie s when all agen ts, inclu
ding the US gover nmen t,
behav e comp etitiv ely.
Ecks tein and Eiche nbaum (1982 ) show that when oil
supp liers are
comp etitiv e and US impo rts have an effec t on oil
price s, there exist s an
optim al, time cons isten t tarif f polic y for the USA.
However, there is
no role for US gover nmen t inven torie s. Ecks tein
and Eiche nbaum conje ctutf ed
that if there is a case for US gover nmen t inven torie
s it shoul d stem from
strat egic cons idera tions arisi ng from the fact that
oil price s decre ase
as US inven torie s rise.
In secti on 4 we turn to a strat egic setti ng in which
the US
gover nmen t and OPEC both have the pote ntial to exerc
ize mark et powe r.
Impo sing the optim al tarif f each perio d (the strat
egy consi dered by
Ecks tein and Eiche nbaum (1982 » provi des the first
-bes t means for the
US gover nmen t to expl oit its mark et powe r. Howe
ver, unles s the US
gover nmen t sets its tarif fs befor e OPEC estab lishe
s its price each perio d,
the US gover nmen t has no incen tive to set a tarif
f at the_ !:!~ optim al
level at the time it makes its tarif f decis ion.
In the absen ce of equit y inves tmen t by OPEC in the
USA the.! :! post
optim al tarif f is in fact zero.

If OPEC has inves ted in US equit y, howe ver,

the opti mal~ post tarif f is posit ive as long as
oil and capi tal are
comp lemen ts in prod uctio n. The tarif f acts indir
ectly as a tax on OPEC's
capi tal incom e. In antic ipati on of the tarif f, OPEC
sets. a lower perio d

0

2 pric e.

OPEC reduc es its price so much that the US price
is actu ally
lowe r, desp ite the tari ff. In addi tion, equi ty
inves tmen t by OPEC acts
dire ctly to reduc e OPEC's secon d perio d pric e.
The reaso n is that OPEC
take s into acco unt the effe ct of its prici ng deci
sion on the rate of
retu rn on its inves tmen t in the USA. When capi
tal and oil are subs titut es,
a high er oil price means a lowe r retur n. Tbet"
e are thus -two chan nels
wher eby a high leve l of equi ty inves tmen t by OPEC
in the USA acts to
redu ce the secon d perio d pric e of oil. Neve rthel
ess, even when equi ty
hold ings are posi tive the US gove rnme nt would
incre ase US welf are if it
could cred ibly impose the tari ff that is optim
al from a n ~ ~
pers pect ive.
In thisc onte xt inve ntor ies can act as a seco nd-b
est subs titut e
for a tari ff. The US gove rnme nt can redu ce the
perio d 2 pric e by buyin g
inve ntor ies in perio d land selli ng them in perio
d 2. In sect ion 4 we
show how, give n the perio d 1 pric e, the US gove
rnme nt has an ince ntive
to buy inve ntor ies in perio d 1 and to sell them
in perio d 2 in orde r to
lowe r the perio d 2 pric e. No atom istic priv ate
agen t has an ince ntive
to purs ue this polic y sinc e he will take the secon
d perio d pric e as
give n. Whet her or not the gove rnm ent's ~ post
optim al inve ntory
respo nse actu ally raise s US welf are vis-a -vis
the no inten tory situa tion
cann ot be asce rtain ed in gene ral. In fact it
can go eith er way.
Nich ols and Zeck haus er (1977 ) show how in the
framework we
cons ider here (in the abse nce of taxe s or inves
tmen t of any form ), an
inve ntory polic y can raise US welf are as well
as OPEC's. An inve ntory
polic y redu ces the disto rtion doe to OPEC's mono
poly powe r. The USA
and OPEC shar e the gain . We pres ent thei r exam
ple in sect ion 5. We find ,
howe ver, that thei r resu lt is very sens itive to
thei r spec ifica tion of
the prob lem. We show in anot her example that
if OPEC's util ity func tion
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is lorarithmic rather than linear in each period's consumption, that
a US inventory policy lowers US welfare relative to a no inventory
situation.

A lower US welfare is also obtained when OPEC and the US

government set price and inventory simultaneously rather than with OPEC
acting as a Stackelberg leader.

In each case the positive impact of the

anticipation of a US inventory on the first period price more than offsets
its negative impact on second period price.

When the US government chooses

inventories the period l price is a bygone so that the US government
nevertheless has an incentive to set inventories at a positive level.

In

this case the government's capacity to acquire a stockpile actually reduces
US welfare. 3

These results imply that if a government inventory policy

is to raise US welfare, inventory purchases must respond to OPEC's prices,
i.e. OPEC must act as a Stackelberg leader in setting price each period.
Another example shows that, when the US government acts as a Stackelberg
leader in setting inventories, the optimal level is zero.
Section 6 contains a discussion of some other work that considers
the desirability of government inventories.

Here we discuss papers by

Maskin and Newbury (1978), Wright and Williams (1982) and Tolley and
Wilman (1977).

Finally, section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
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2.

The Technology
In this section we describe the 11ain aspects of production and

preferences of the environment

that we consider in this paper.

Our

focus is on bilateral trade in an exhaustable resource, oil, that
.
enters into production of a single consumed good. There-are two

...

nations:

the oil consuming country -the ''USA"; and the oil producing

country - "OPEC".

There are two periods for consumption and production.

There is only one consumption good that if stored in the first period
serves as capital in the second period.

We define the following

variables:
Ci• Consumption in the USA in period

·*
Ci•

i • 1, 2

Consumption in OPEC in period i • 1, 2

Ki• Capital stock in the USA in period_ i • 1, 2, (~ is
given as an initial condition.)
investment in capital in the USA in the first period

llK •

K2 - K1 •

Oi •

consumption of oil in the USA in period

I

inventories of oil in the USA at the end of the first period

•

Mi•

· e1

•

imports of oil in the USA in period

i • 1, 2

i • 1, 2

one plus the import tax rate on oil in the USA in period i • 1,

9k • one plus the tax rate on foreign investment in the USA in period
P • international price of oil in terms of the single consumpi

tion good in period

i • 1, 2.

11

Interest payments on capital investment in the USA in the

•

r

•econd period.

*

R

Stock of oil in OPEC at the beginning of the first period

•

F(Ki, Oi) • output of the consumption good in the USA tn

Qi -

F(•,•) is stri.!=VY concave in both

period i • 1, 2.
argwnents.

H •
D(I)•

OPEC investaent in the USA in period one
of oil in the second period given an inventory

Units

of I units of oil in the first period. For all I> 0,
0 <

D(I)

<

I

,

D' (I) > 0

and D" (I) > 0 •

We assume that the production of the only consumption-ca pital good
is done in the USA.

There is no depreciation of capital and extraction

costs of oil are zero.

OPEC may invest some of its oil revenues in the

first period in the USA and receive the interest payments in

the

second period.

Finally, preferences of the representative

consumer/producer in the USA and OPEC are given, respectively, by

where U(•) and
zero and one.

U*(•) are strictly concave and S and S* are between
Obviously one aay consider a auch more complicated

*
environment in which the total reserves of oil in OPEC, R, are uncertain,
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where the USA also has an exhaustable stock of oil, extraction of oil
is costly, there are third countries, etc.

We later consider some

extensions along these lines, but we prefer first to present our
model in its simplest form.
While this framework is very simple, we··,believe that it captures
the easential relationship s between the United States and the oil producing
countries.

First, it recognizes, albeit in a simple way, that the

supply of oil depends fundamental ly upon the intertempor al allocation of
resources.

Second, OPEC countries do recieve a large share of their

consumption goods from the OECD countries.

Third, aany OPF.C countries

have substantial investments in OECD countries.

Our aodel allows their

oil pricing decisions to affect their return on these investments .

After learning about the technologic al characteris tics of
this world and before observing the actual market structure, one
might wonder:

''Why is the government of the USA buying oil from

OPEC and putting it in the Salt Domes in Louisiana?

They call th_em

Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) - does it make sense?"

In order

to understand it we might first consider the competitive allocation
of resources with no government interventio n.

The "second best"

arguments in favor of the St'R are not considered, since we do not
want to justify one policy instrument due to misuse of another policy
instrwnent.

.l.J

3.

The Competitive Case
The perfect foresight optimal:,all ocation can be characterize d by

solving the 'social planning' problem of the above economy.

It is straight

forward to show that this allocation is identical to the world competitive

p~rfect foresight equilibrium . 4
The social planning problem is to maxillize

subject to
(3.2)
(3.3)
{3.4)

0l

+ o2 +

-

I - D (I) <

R*

,

by

choice of

c1 , c2 , c1*, c*2 ,

AK,

o1 , o2

and I.

Let

A , A andµ be
2
1
the Lagrangian multipliers of equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4), respectively •.
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are the world budget constraints each period,
Equation (3.4) states that world oil consumption across the two periods

cannot exceed the total world supply, R.

Then

, th e fi rat order condition

with respect to inventories is
(3.5)

-µ(1 - D'(I)) <

Given that

JJ

-

0

(• 0 if

I

>

O )

·>0 , since we assume an economy in which

(3.5) implies that

I• 0 if

0 < D'(I) < 1.

oil is consumed each peric

G
iven our assumption that
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oil does not apprec iate in storag e, we conclud e that in a perfec t
foresig ht equilib rium. there will b·e

~

storage of oil.

The reason is

that the economy is better off holding the oil in the ground with
zero invento ry costs than above the ~round incurri ng the cost I - D(I).
It is also obvious that the inclusi on of linear extrac tion costs does
not affect the above result .
It is of intere st to see the charac terizat ion of the compet itive
equilib rium resulti ng from the above plannin g solutio n.

Given that

the real price of oil in period 1. i • 1, 2, we get that

pi=

i • 1, 2, from the first order conditi ons with respec t to

r•

Oi.

i

P is
1

F2 (Ki' 0 ) ,
1

Then, the

equilib rium is charac terized by the conditi ons

(3.6)
and

•

U'* '(C* )
1

S*U* '(C * )
2

(3.7)

Equatio n (3.6) establi shes that the 11argin al rate of subtitu tion is
equal to the margin al rate of transfo rmatio n in both the USA and OPEC, and
equatio n (3.7) is simply the Hotelli ng rule for extrac tion of an exhaus table
resourc e. 5
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3.1

Conven ience Yield
Now we wonder not only about the government strateg ic petrole um

reserve s but also about the existen ce of private storage .

In fact the

private stocks of crude petrole um in the USA are as large as the level
of monthly sales (about 300-350 million barrels ) and their existen ce
should be explain ed.

The industr y term for such stocks is 'operat ing

stocks, They help to get the oil to the consum er.

In the economic

literat ure this is called the "conve nience yield" (see Brenna n, 1958)
which can be analyt ically modeled using ad-hoc functio nal forms of costs
of holding invent ories.

These typica lly yield an invento ry rule that

is a functio n of oil consum ption or output produc tion (see, e.g.,
Eckste in and Eichenbaum, 1982).

Usually it is assumed that for an

invento ry below some given level, say I*, there are negativ e margin al

.

costs of invent ories where the level I * is given exogen ously.

We ~ould

introdu ce a .conven ience yield into our example by consid ering a storage
techno logy,

D(I)

over some range

(3.8)

that has the proper ties
I< I.

D(I) > I, D"(I)

<

0

The compe titive solutio n would then establi sh

P D' (I) • P r
2
1

as the first-o rder conditi on for a maximum.

Equatio n (3.6) and (3.7)

would continu e to charac terize. the optimum.

Thus the compet itive solutio n

would be fully charac terized by the conditi ons

16

-

(3.9)

The first three of these conditions would also characterize the planner's
solution.

If

D(I)

is increasing and differentiable the solution

* • 1 both for the social planner and for the
establishes D'(I)
competitive equilibrium.

The "convenience yield" argument thus

justifies private operating stocks but not any government SPR.
S.2 Uncertainty
Another popular reason for private and possibly public
inventories is given by the existence of uncertainty about the oil
supply or proven oil reserves.

The argument is based on precautionary

savings to smooth final consumption.

In the presence of a full

set of contingent commodity markets this argument seems without
merit.

Private agents could optimally insure by trading contingent

claims.

If storage is costly (i.e., if D(I)< I), then an allocation

(supportable by a competitive equilibrium) without storage exists which
is Pareto superior to any allocation with storage.

not extend to

■ ituation

This result would

in which extraction costs are non-linear,

however.
It is possible that a full set of contingent claim markets
does not exist, however,

A aore fundamental problem might be the non

existence of property rights in an international context.

Private

agents in the USA cannot obtain property rights over oil that is in
the ground in OPEC.

-:7-

Americans may be prohibited from acquiring these rights or else they
may not trust OPEC governments' willingness to enforce these rights.

In

this context an additional argument for storing oil emerges: as a form of
insurance.
We illustrate this result in

the comp~titive model by assuming

* is not known until period 2.
that the total stock of OPEC reserves, R,

6

We assume there .a.r.e no contingent commodity markets or futures markets.
(In fact, there are no formal contingent markets, and futures
limited, none covering a period greater than one year.)
on spot markets.

markets are

All oil is sold

The second period price, then, is established by equating

second period supply, (R* (s) - o - I+ D(I)), where R* (s) denotes the
1
oil supply in state of nature s, to second period demand, o , determined
2
by the condition

(3.10)
This condition implicitly defines a demand function
(3.11)

which is increasing in K + ~ K and decreasing in
1
in state s is then established by the condition

(3.12)
The interest payment on investment is given by
(3 .13)

P •
2

Equilibrium price

-18-

Consider now .the inventory decision of a US agent in period 1.

AK, I and o1 , ta~ing P1 , H,

He chooses

and r(s) as given, to maximize:

(3.13)

B

2 Il

(s) U[F(K

s

+

AK, E (K

1

+

'1K, P (s)) 2

denotes the probability with which

Il(s)

Here

1

conditions for
(3.14a)

I

and

AK
>

8

!n

R*•

r(s) H

The first-order

R(s).

are
(s)

U'(c 2 ) r(s)

(• 0

if AK> 0)

s

(3.ll.b)

P

1

U'(C )~Blil(s) U'(C 2 )P 2 (s)D'{I)
1

(•O

if

I>O)

s

·If

AK

(3.15)

and I are strictly positive, these conditions imply

P (s)
2
D' (I)
)
(C
U'
Il(s)
r(s))
(C
U'
Il(s)
2
2
pl
s
s

2

i

The OPEC first order conditions with respect to Hand\
yield that
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(3.16)
if

r n(s) u
s

*·' · (C * )
2

r(s) -=

n(s)

u* '

_s

M2 are positive.

Hand

r

Under certainty (3.15) is inconsisten t

with (3.16), which yields the Hotelling

rule,

p2

p •

r, since D'(I)

<

1,

1
(see (3.9), and the left-hand side of (3.15) is greater than the right-

hand side).

Hence,under certainty, !• 0.

Under uncertainty , when

U(Ci) is concave,the n both (3.15) and (3.16) can hold as equalities.
Hence, there are equilibria in which I is positive.

The reason is that

under uncertainty U'(C 2) and P2 (s) are positively correlated when
Via Shephard's

D(I) • 0.

lemma

(3.17)

The diminishing marginal utility of consumption implies that this
expression is positive (assuming that some oil is imported in
P2 (s) is high U'(C 2) will also be high: for
oil importers, a high price of oil lowers consumption , raising the
period 2).

Thus when

marginal utility of consumption .
The positive correlation between U'(C 2) and P2 (s) raises the
term on the right hand side of equation (3.15).

The expected return

on inventories is greater because inventories serve as a hedge.

This

provides a justificatio n for holding inventories .
Two comments about this result are in order.
agents could buy oil in the futuresmark et

First, if US

or obtain property rights

over oil in the groun::iin OPEC, inventories would not be desirable as
long as

D(I)

<

I.

Second, this result, by itself, does not justify
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the establishm ent of a government reserve unless the government has
a superior storage technolog y {i.e., _for the government

D(I) is larger.)

The simplest competiti ve case thus yields no justifica tion for
inventori es at all.

A convenien ce yield, however, or uncertain ty

but an incomplet e set of contingen tcommodi ty markets and imperfect
cross-nat ional property rights are reasons
the USA.

why oil stocks may benefit

In these cases the private sector holds a level of inventori es

that maximizes social welfare as well.

Therefore , one may still wonder

what scope there is for government holdings of inventori es.

Next we

find, however, that once strategic considera tions in the relations hip
between OPEC and the USA are introduce d, an argument for a government
SPR emerges.

An argument can also emerge, however, in favor of

divesting the US government of its capacity to store oil.
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4.

The Bil ater al Monopoly Cas e:

A Pos sibl e Jus tifi cat ion for the SPR

The pres enc e of nati ona l mar ket

power freq uen tly yiel ds situ atio n~

in which government inte rv~ ntio n can
improve nat ion al wel fare if not
world wel fare . The nati ona lly opti mal
tar iff is an exam ple.
In fac t in 1978 OPEC prov ided 65% of
pro duc tion in non-Communist
cou ntri es whi le the U.S . acco unte d for
55 perc ent of consumption in
main consuming cou ntri es. 7 The re is
cer tain ly a pres ump tion of market
power on the par t of OPEC, to the exte
nt tha t it can mai ntai n its coh esiv e
as a car tel. We assume here tha t it
can . The re seems to be a pres ump tion
of mar ket power on the USA's par t as
wel l, alth oug h this is less stro ng.
If we were to con side r a pot ent ial oilimp orti ng cou ntry car tel con sist ing
of the OECD or the Inte rna tion al Ene
rgy Agency (IEA ), the assu mpt ion of a
bila tera l monopoly situ atio n betw een
sell ers and buy ers would cer tain ly
fit the fac ts clo sely . Even in the abse
nce of a car tel arra nge men t
among imp orte rs, the assu mpt ion of bila
tera l 110nopoly seems to cap ture
much of the rela tion ship betw een OPEC
and the USA,
In this sec tion we con side r how the pres
enc e of a bila tera l
1110nopoly situ atio n can cre ate an ince
ntiv e on the par t of the US gov ern
•en t to esta blis han SPR. To focu s clea
rly on stra teg ic con side rati ons
ve igno re the con ven ienc e yie ld and unc
erta inty con side rati ons rais ed
ear lier . In the nex t sec tion we show
, via exam ple, tha t by purs uing
an inve ntor y pol icy the US government
can rais e US wel fare . But it can
also low er it. Bec ause res ults are ,
in gen era J,se nsit ive to the
spe cifi cati on of beh avio r, we find it
use ful to disc uss alte rna tive
"ru les of the game" tha t we can cho ose
among.

4.1 Rules of the Game
We now consider alternative rules of behavior in relationships
between the USA and OPEC.

We identify as OPEC's strategy

variables

the oil prices (P , P ) and OPEC's levels of investment in the USA (H).
2
1
The US government's strategy variables are the tariff rates on oil
in periods 1 and 2 (9

1

- 1 and

e2

- 1), the tax rate on OPEC's

investments (0k - 1), and the level of government inventory holdings
(I).

US private agents, behaving atomistically, choose oil consumption

in periods 1 and 2, (0 ; o ), investment (~K) • and private inventories
2
1

(IF) to maximize discounted utility •. We asswne that US private agents
correctly anticipate the policies that are actually pursued both by
OPEC and by the US government but then take them parametrically.
4.1-1

Open Loop Policies
An open loop policy is one in which values of the strategy

variables are set for the current and future periods as of the initial
period.

Within the class of open loop policies we can identify strategic

variables that are chosen by one player prior to the choice of some
other strategic variable by the other player (in which case the first
player acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to those variables,
the first player taking into account the effect of

his choice on the

response of the second player) or the decisions are made simultaneously
by the two players, in which case they act as non-cooperative Nash
players with respect to those variables, each taking the level set by
the other player as given in making his choice.
When the game is specified as open loop, the issue of time
consistency does not arise.

The levels of the strategic variables

set in the first period (whether in a Nash or Stackelberg fashion) are the ot

actually implemented.

.A difficulty with this formulation is that

the players may not have an incentive, in the second period, to follow
the open loop solution.

Because of this inconsistency,t he open loop

policy will not be credible.

Open loop solutions therefore may not be able

to explain the behavior that we observe.

Nevertheless, the open loop snh,tir

provides an interesting benchmark against which to compare time consistent
solutions.
4.1-2

Feedback Solutions and Perfect Equilibria
An alternative policy is one that maximizes the objectives of

each player as of the period the policy is implemented, taking previous
policy as given.

The two players thus play a separate game each period.

The policies that are pursued each period are the outcome of that
period's game.

Hence,the players' decisions are based upon feedback

from the previous period.

When players correctly take into account the

effect of each.period's decision on the outcome of subsequent games
then the solution to the set of games is described as "perfect."
(gee Selten, 1975, for a discussion of perfection and Kydland, 1977, for a
discussion of the distinction between open loop and feedback solutions.)
The advantage of a specification of this type is that the solution that
emerges is based upon behavior that is in each player's interest at
the time he acts.
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Within the class of feedback solutions we can also distinguish
between variables that ·are chosen ~n-a Nash or Stackelberg fashion.
This choice should be dictated by the underlying technology of the
problem.
We do not consider all possibilities for__structuring the game.
We assume the following rules.
Rl (a)

OPEC acts as a Stackelberg leader each period with respect to
price (i.e., OPEC chooses P before the US government chooses
1
and 18 ; OPEC chooses P before the USA chooses e2 and Qk)
2

Rl (b)

OPEC and the USA act as Nash players with respect to
lg

Rl (c)

R2 ·

in period 1 and with respect to

The USA acts as a Stackelberg
USA chooses

9

chooses

and

0

2

1

and

lg

P , 9 and Gk
2
2

P , G and
1
1
in period 2.

leader each period (i.e., the

before OPEC chooses

P , the USA
1

Gk before OPEC chooses P2 ).

US private agents take the values of US government and OPEC
strategic·variables as parametric.

Subject to these parameters

they maximize utility.
R3

Both OPEC and the US government correctly anticipate the effect
of their policy on US private agents' behavior.

R4

All agents have perfect foresight.

o1

Rule l(a) best captures the stra~egy implicit in the IEA's
stockpiling procedures:· purchases are made contingent upon the oil
price that OPEC sets.

Rules l(b) and l(c) reflect more accurately the

stockpiling procedure embodied in the Energy security Act:
procede

4.2

purchases

independently of OPEC's price.

The Solution

We now attempt to characterize the solution to the game.

Since

first period decision; affect outcomes in both periods while, in the
second period, first period decisions and outcomes are a bygone, it is
simplest to consider the second period first.
4.2-1

The Second Period
Profit maximizing firms in the US private sector choose

maximize profits.

Given the US domestic price

o2 to

e2P2 this behavior

implies the first-order condition
(4.1)

(• 0

if

02 > 0)

which implicitly defines the second period oil demand function
(4.2)
where

<

o,

as oil and capital are substitutes or complements.

In the case of constant returns to scale (CRS) in capital
and oil this function takes the form.
(4.2')
Substituting (4.2) into (4.1) gives second period output as a function of
the capital stock and the second period oil price

G(Kl + AK,

(4.3)

c

9 P )
2 2

1

In the case of CRS this function takes the form

>

0,

G
2

<

0

·s

(4.3')
OPEC's investment in the lTSA pays a;n interest rate

r

equal, before

tax, to the marginal product of capital
G (K + AK, 9 P ) (• g (G P ) under CRS).
2 2
1 1
2 2
We assume that the US government's objective is to maximize the

utility of US private agents.

In period 2 first period consumption

is, of course, a bygone. and the policy in period 2 can only affect period 2
consumption.
(4.4)

c2

The US government therefore maximizes

• G(Ki + A K, 9 P ) - Gk G H
2 2
1

- P [E(9 P ,ii +AK) - D(Ig) - D(Ip)]
2
2 2

U(C ) where
2
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Under rules Rl (a) and Rl (b) government policy involves choices
of G2 and Qk that maximize

ta.kin~

P , as well as b K, lg
2

and

o1 ,

c2 is strictly decreas1ng in Qk and a maximum, therefore, involve~

as given.

establi~hing

Qk

at its minimum level

OPEC investments.
with respect to

When

USA acts taking P

(zero). effectively confiscating

Gk• 0 the first-order condition for a maximum

G is given by
2

which is satisfied at

An

c2

2

G • 1, the zero tariff condition.
2

Since the

as given, the optimal tariff is zero.

interesting case emerges when the US is constrained to set

Gk> O, i.e., not to confiscate fully OPEC investment.
the first-order condition for

In this case

G is
2

(4.6)
Thus if capital and oil ar.e complements (F > O) then the tariff on oil
12
should be positive (raising
substitutes

{F

12

<

F above P ) and conversely if they are
2
2
Intuitively, the tariff acts as an indirect

0).

tax on OPEC investments.

9

If the US government is constrained not to

tax these investment fully, then a tariff redistributes income away
from OPEC to the USA.
tariff is given by

In the CRS case the formula for the optimal

(4.7)

t

*

-

in which case the tariff is independent of

P • When there is no
2
9k • 0 (confiscatio n of OPEC equity)

OPEC investment in equity or when
the optimal tariff is zero.

Consider, now, OPEC's problem.

In period 2 .OPEC sets

maximize the utility of OPEC's period 2 consumption .
period 1 consumption is at this point

a

bygone.

P to
2

As with the USA,

OPEC therefore sets

* *

P to 111aximize period 2 utility, U (C ), where
2
2

(4.8)

Under rule

Rl(a) OPEC considers the effect of

order condition with respect to P

2

(4.9)

o2

P

- D(_I 8 ) - D{I )

+

(P

2

P

2

on

e2 • The first

is given by:

+

d0

2

Qk G H ) - - - - (G
d(G P)
12
2

2 2

dQ

+ -dP 2
2

P )
2

subject to the constraint
Dividing (4.,) by

o2 yields

(4.9')

where

,

the elasticity of US oil demand

c

0
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p2

2) and

with respect to the US price (Q P
2

Q2

, the elasticity

of the US tariff with respect to

P • Note that under CRS, t RO;
2
the US tariff is independent of P •
2
Condition (4.9') implicitly defines P
as a function of lg,
2
n
I p, vn 2 , vk,
and H • The most important point to note is that the
that solves (4.9') falls as
addition, when

H•

domestic price.

If

an increase in

O, P

2

18

f

and

falls as

H > O and c

9
12

2

rise as

a share

of

o2 •

In

rises to maintain a constant

> 0 (oil and capital are complements)

9

causes P
to fall in greater proportion, lowering
2
2
not only the world price but the domestic price as we11: 0
This completes the characterizatio n of second-period equilibrium
wnder rule

Rl(a), with OPEC acting as a Stackelberg leader in setting P •
2
When the level of 9 implied by equation (4.6) is independent of P ,
2
2
as in the case under CRS, then the solution under rule ~l(b), with OPEC
and the US acting as Nash players, is exactly the same as under rule
Rl(a).

Under rule Rl(c), with the US acting as a Stackelberg Leader

in setting

G , the US can impose the traditional optimal tariff.
2

equation (4.9') G P
2 2

stays constant or falls as

In this case the optimal tariff rate is infinite.

9

2

rises if G H
12

From
>

O.

Introducing extraction
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cost s or othe r buye rs would modify .this resu lt,
but the poin t is that
the US can exer t its monopsony power via tari ffs
only if it is able to
commit itse lf to a tari ff rate befo re OPEC sets
P •
2
4.2-2

The Firs t Perio d.

choi ce vari able s,

Taking the solution.S. to the secon d perio d

as give n depe nding upon I p , Ig, K + 6K
1
H, and' R* - M we now cons ider how these magn
itude s are deter mine d
2
in perio d 1. Here we assume Gk• 1 (no taxa
tion of OPEC inve stme nt incom e).
The US priv ate sect or take s OPEC and US governme
nt polic y varia bles
8 2 and

P2 ,

~K and

1P where

(4.10 )
with resp ect to

o1 ,

(4.ll a)

(4.ll b)

Here

T and T deno te taxe s each perio d. We assum
e that they are
1
2
imposed in a lump-sum fash ion. The government
budg et cons train t impl ies.
(4.12 a)

(4.12 b)
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First-order conditions for a maximum are
(4.13a)

<

(• 0

0

(4.13b)

(4.13c)

(•O if

I

p

> O)

These equations implicitly define functions for first period oil demand,
investment demand, and private inventory demand.
Consider now the problem facing the US governmentunder rules Rl(a)
and Rl(b).
lg

Taking P parametrically the US government chooses G and
1
1
to maximize social welfare, given,as before, by expression (4.10).

The US government correctly anticipates the effect of its decisions this
period on this period's private sector behavior (as determined by
equations (4.13))

and on the second period outcome.

Consider the first-order equation for a maximum with respect to 1 8 ,

(4.14)

(•O

if

lg > O)

dP

2 is positive.
Comparing (4.14) with (4.13c) observe
dlg
that the US government has an incentive to invest in inventories beyond

From (4.9)

that facing the private sector.

The reason is that individuals in the
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US private sector, taking both

e1P1

and

e2P2

as given, do not take

into accom1t the effect of their own inventory decision on lowering the
second period price.
own

The US government internalizes the effect of its

inventory decision on the second period price.

The US government

then, facing a given first period price, has an incentive to accumulate
inventories even when the private sector does not.

e1

Subsidizing first period imports, via setting
an alternative method of lowering

P

> 1,

provides

by raising private inventories.

2

This approach subsidizes first-period oil consumption as well as inventory
accumulation, however.

A

direct government investment in inventories

does not suffer this difficulty.
establish

F

2

• P

1

The private sector continues to

whether or not

lg

is positive.

If the government

has available a storage technology that is not, at the margin, inferior
to that provided by the private sector then the optimal first period
tariff is zero.
Consider now OPEC's decision.
maximize

where

OPEC chooses

p and H to

1
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Under rule

Rl(a) OPEC acts anticipating the effect of its choice on lg

and

G , as well as on the second·period equilibrium. Under rules Rl(b)
1
"
and Rl(c) it treats 18 and G as given. US government inventories
1
augment first-period demand. Under rules Rl{b) and Rl(c) P1 is
18 > O.

necessarily greater when

emerge when OPEC is a leader.

If

This result does not necessarily
lg

is very price elastic it is

conceivable that a government inventory purchase could lower
any event OPEC will set

P
1

Rl{c), given any level of
Finally, under rule

at

a higher

P •
1

In

level under rules Rl{b) and

18 •
Rl{c), the US government chooses

anticipating OPEC's response.

Because an increase in 18

91

and

now raises

18
P1 ,

~he US government has less incentive to implement a reserve policy.
While releasing the inventory lowers the price in period 2 acquiring
it raises

P •
1

Under rules Rl{a) and Rl{b) US policy takes the second

into account bot not the first, P
1

is a bygone when

18

is established.

Nevertheless, OPEC, in anticipating (under Rl{a)) or observing (under Rl(b))
a US government inventory, is likely to establish a higher

P as a
1

consequence.
Calculating the overall welfare effects of optimal inventory
policy under alternative rules of the game is difficult in a general
setting.

In the next section we use a simple quadratic case to

consider these issues further.
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5.

An Uneasy Case for Government Inventories:

A Quadratic Example

We now consider a special cas·e of the game discussed in section 4,
making specific assumptions about the functional forms that describe
technology and preferences.

Our first and fourth examples assume that

the behavior of the U.S. government and OPEC is described by rule
Rl(a), OPEC acts as a Stackelberg leader each period.

Our third example

is one in which the U.S. acts first (rule Rl(c)).
We consider the following production function
(5.1)

al

2

Qi• F(Ki, 01) • aOKi -2 Ki+ a2Ki0i + a30i

Note that this function exhibits decreasing returns to scale in
capital and oil.
5 .1

The Second Period
We assume that the return on investment in US capital is

....

the same for U.S. citizens and OPEC members and is equal to the marginal
product of capital, i.e.,

That is, the U.S. government sets 8k

- o.

The private sector sets

the demand for imports of oil in the second period by equating the marginal
product of oil to the market price, i.e.
and
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where

I •Ip+ lg• privat e inven tories + public inven tories .

Then we

get that

(5.3)

M
2

+

D(I) •

•
a
~2
_! + -..£ (K + 6K) - - P
a
a
1
84 2
4
4

We consid er only a limite d set of instru ments for US government
interv ention .
In the second period the only instru ment availa ble is the tariff
on oil.
object ive of the US govern ment is to maximize second period utilit
y by
maximizing c?• i.e.
.

subjec t to (5.1) - (5.3).

The first order condit ion is:

and the optima l tax on impor ts is
* a 2H
(5.4)
8 • -.-- + l
2

Thus

p2

the optim al tariff rate is zero

in two cases:

(i)

OPEC

does not invest in the first period in the USA (H • O) • or (ii)
oil and capita l are separa ble in the produ ction of the consum ption
good (a • 0).
2

The

Now we turn to OPEC's determination of the second period price by
maximizing its second period consumption, i.e., it maximizes P2M2 + F H
1
subject to (5.1) - (5.4) by choice of P2 • The optimal P2 turns out to
be
8

3

82

2 + -2 [ (K1 +

(5.5)

P2 • -

6K) J

-

84

a H - -

2

2

...
D (I)

Again we observe that if oil and capital are separable in production
(a

2 • O),the capital stock does not affect the determination of oil prices

in the second period.

Furthermore, P

2

is a linear function of capital

·but OPEC has an incentive to decrease oil prices as J!!_ investment in the

US is larger.

This result suggests why different members of OPEC would

have different incentives in setting oil prices conditional on their
portfolio decisions.

Finally, it is important to observe that

as US inventories go up.

p

2

decreases

This result establishes a possible role for

public inventories if the US government in the first period takes into
account OPEC supply behavior in the second period, while US private agents
take

P2

parametrically.

the fact that the US takes

That P2

falls as I rises is independent of

P2 parametrically in period 2 while OPEC is

assumed to act upon (5.4), i.e.,that OPEC is a Stackelberg leader in setting P2 .
Under rule Rl(b), in which OPEC takes 9* parameterically so that
2

e2

are set simultaneously in a noncooperative Nash game, then the optimal

turns
(5.6)

and P2
P2

-37Note that if

H

O the Nash solut ion and the solut ion with OPEC

c

as the Stack elberg leade r yield the same price .
may toove eithe r way with 82'
is posit ive.

Other wise, P
2

P moves negat ively with D(I) as long
2

Whichever game is playe d in the secon d perio d,

the oil price is not affec ted by total capit al (K + ~K)
and by Hin the
1
same degre e. The resul ts in the secon d perio d are indep
enden t of the
utili ty funct ion since the maxim izatio n of welfa re is equal
ivant to the
maxim izatio n of consu mptio n.
The third logic al possi bility , of cours e, obtai ns when the
US
acts as a Stack elberg leade r (Jtule JU(~} ) •

As we showed in sectio n 4,

in this case the US can impose the optim al tarif f, drivin
g the world price
to zero (the margi nal extra ction cost for oil that we have
assumed here) .
5.2
5.2-1

The First Perio d and the Comp lete Solut ion
Example 1 (Nich ols and Zeckh auser)

To solve the first perio d proble m we have to postu late a
utili ty
funct ion for both the USA and OPEC. We first assume that
utili ty is
linea r and that
S • S* • 1. In this case inven tories benef it
the USA. We then compare the government inven tory polic
y with 8
tax/su bsidy scheme.

In order to do so, we make the follow ing assum ptions

Al:

H • ~K • O,i.e ., no inves tment

A2:

D(I) • I

e2

Al 'impl ies that

i.e., no costs of inven tory of oil
• 1 and as a resul t we get the follow ing equat ions

for the secon d perio d proble m.
'\,

(5. 7)

p2

M2

83
---84
a4

I

'\,

(5.8)

ElJ

iP 2 -

-2

84

2-I

3 = a 2K1+ a 3
Note that thes e solu tion s obta in-e ithe r when
the US and OPEC esta blis h
9 and P as the outcome of nonc oope rativ e
Nash game£!_ when OPEC acts
2
2
as a Stac kelb erg lead er.
wher e

'\,

a

Tog ethe r (5.7 ) and (5.8 ) yiel d
(5.9 )
Sinc e cap ital is cons tant we can writ e the
prod uctio n of the sing le good
at time i as:
(5.1 0)

where
We cons ider the economy unde r alte rnat ive
US government poli cies .
case (i): the US gove rnme nt choo ses bot h~
and I in the USA in the firs t
peri od taki ng the stru ctur e of the peri od
2 prob lem as give n. Given the
line ar util ity func tion s the US gove rnme nt's
prob lem is to maximize

subj ect to (5.8 ), (5.9 ) and (5.1 0) by choi ce
of M1 and I . The firs t
orde r cond ition s with resp ect to I and M
1 , reap ecti vely ,are :
(5.1 1)
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(5.12)

Solving for

I

(5.13)

I •

(5.14)

M

and

M as functions of
1

P we get,
1

•

l

Given the above result with respect to US

government decision rules

P1~ + P M subject to (5.8), (5.9), (5.10),
2 2
(5.13) and (5.14) by choosing P • The result is

OPEC's problem is to maximize

1

9 "'
8

(5.15)

pl • 17

3

Hence, we have the following allocation of resources in the two
periods1~

(5.16)

Utility levels in the U.S. and OPEC are
(5.17a)

(5.17b)

U • C

l

+

C

2

c

2a K -

o 1

a K2 +

11

ill

"' 2,

c•J)

578 a

4

respectively

Hence, the price of oil falls from period one to period two and
inventories are

5
11 of oil consump_tion at the second period. We now

turn to the case where there is no US
Case (ii):
inventories.

US

private agents choose both oil conslDllption and oil
There is no government intervention.

maximize profitsby setting
set

government intervention.

US

private agents

o1 such that F2 (K1 , o1 ) • P1 and they

IP> 0 if

P < P
and otherwise IP• 0.
2
1
conditions with respect to o imply that
1

The first order

(5.18)

As a result, we can solve OPEC's problem assuming that

IP• O and then

see whether the condition for zero inventories is satisfied.

OPEC's problem
I P. 0 •

1 '\,

P • P2 • 2 a
and the condition'\rfor zero inventories
1
3
8
1 3
is satisfied. Furthermore, we get that M • M • - - • o • o •
1
2
1
2
2 •4
Hence, the two periods are completely symmetric and the model is equivalent
Hence, we get that

to the case in which OPEC is a simple m:>nopoly in both periods separately.
are, respectively,
(5 .19a)

(5.19b)

Case (iii):
inventories.

US private agents choose

o1 while the US government chooses

o is determined by (5.17)
1
which is identical to (5.12), the first order condition with respect
The allocation of

to M in case (i). Hence, the solution for US optimal inventories
1
turns out to be identical to that of case (i) - {5.13), and the final
allocation of case (iii) and {i) are identical and given by (5.5) and (5.16).
Result

In the above example a monopolistic OPEC behaves as a Stackelberg

leader in a time consistent game and optimal ·private inventories are zero.
This is equivalent to the result of zero private (optimal) inventories in
the case of competition (section 3).

However, given the fact that the

government can exploit the effect of inventories on oil prices in the
second period, we find that the optimal US allocation is to have a positive
level of inventories which raises the first period oil price and lowers the
second period price. 12 Hence, the US government has a real cost of holdin~
inventories, {P1 - P2)1, but it creates a welfare gain from changing the
terms of trade and reducing the monopoly power of OPEC in the second
period.
We can present the result on a graph.
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Moving from no interve ntion in the USA to a government invento ry policy,
the demand and margin al revenue curves that OPEC faces are moving from
the solid lines to the broken lines.

The USA looses the area

P1*P BA of consumer surplus in the first period while it gains the
area P P*
2c B of consumer surplus in the second period and here the differe nce

is positiv e.
Given the sequenc e of decisio ns that we assume here, in
case (i) we charac terize the optima l allocat ion for the US governm ent.
We show in case (ii) that the private sector does not achieve the same
alloca tion since it cannot exploi t the negativ e effect of invent ories
on the period 2 oil price.

If the only government instrum ent is a public

invento ry (case iii) the alloca tion is the same as in the first case.
Comparing (5 .17) with (5 .19) note that US welfare is it1 fact
greate r when the US government chooses invento ries optima lly.
additio n, OPEC welfare is greate r as well.

In

US invento ry policy is

reducin g a monopoly distort ion in a way that benefi ts both OPEC and the
USA.

Note that under the invento ry policy import s over the two

period s togethe r are greater than when the US government does not use
invent ories.
Could an optima l level of invent ories be sustain ed by other policie s?
The answer is yes, if the governm ent can impose lump-sum and firm
specif ic taxes and/or subsid ies to make holding the optima l level of

proble m. This
inven tories consi stent with the firm' s profi t maximizing
However, once
set of incen tives must be speci fied in the first perio d.
tive for the
is determ ined in the secon d perio d there will be no incen
consi stenc y
gover nment to fulfi ll its oblig ation s. The previ ous time

P
2

progra m for priva te inven tories .

argum ent appli es to the tax incen tive

govem ment
Only by buyin g the inven tories in perio d 1 itsel f can the
d perio d price
credi bly commit itsel f to a polic y of lower ing the secon
throu gh incre ased inven tories .
Example 2

5.2-2

OPEC
Now assume that rule Rl(b) appli es, the US government and
set

I

8

and

simul taneo usly as non-c ooper ative Nash playe rs rathe r than

P1

seque n~ial ly, i.e., the US gover nment choos es
as befor e, and OPEC sets

P
1

equil ibrium we get

"'
2a
(5.20 )

01 -

p*
1

(5.21 )

5

-

1&s

5

-"'
3a

3

"'
3a

as given .

lg

takin g

02

p2* -

3

3

5

2a
"'

3
5

"'83
5a4

while
(5.22 a)

(5.22 b)

u • c1 + c2

2
1 1

• 2a K - a K

0 1

lg

83
11 "'

+ 50 84

P1 as given ,
In the conse quent

taking
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Compared with a situation in which

lg• O, the USA is again now worse off

while OPEC is again better off.
Moving fron a situation in which the USA acts entirely as a
Stackelberg follower to one in which the US government and OPEC acts
as Nash players reduces US welfare.
demand is price elastic.

The reason is that US inventory

Given the structure of the problem in period

2, · the US government 's demand for inventories is given by
{5.23)

Wh..en OPEC incorporate s {5.23) into its decision-ma king it sets, ceteris
paribus, a lower price.

Taking

lg as given it perceives total demand

as more inelastic and consequentl y sets a higher P •
1
This result is illustrated in Figure 2. While the US inventocy
demand shifts OPEC's demand curve rightward in a Nash game the slope of
OPEC's perceived marginal revenue curve is unaffected by a US government
inventory policy.

When OPEC acts as a leader the optimal US government

inventory policy makes the perceived MR curve flatter.

OPEC consequentl y

charges a lower price each period.
5.2-3. Example 3
Consider now the problem posed in example 1 for the
case in which the US acts as a Stackelberg leader, i.e., rule Rl(c)
applies in period 1.

We continue to assume that rules Rl(a) or Rl(b)

apply in period 2, so that the structure of the second period game is
unchanged. We assume O tariffs.
The US government now sets
'\,
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a Ig

+

4

2

,

taki n g th e pri ce response of
OPEC,

2~
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as given.

It is straightforward to show that in this case the optimal

US government policy is to set

lg• O.

The same solution as that for

!!xample 1, case (ii), i.e., the competitive solution without government
intervention, obtains here.

When the US government must precommit

itself to some level of inventories, it chooses a zero level.

This

result obtainBwhen OPEC has a BeI'l).oulli utility function as well as
when OPEC's utility is linear.
5. 2- 4 Example 4 •
We now show that a US government inventory policy is not necessarily

in the USA's interest even when OPEC acts as a Stackelberg leader.
the following small lllOdification to example 1.

We make

Assume ~hat instead of being

linear in consumption (as in equations (5.17b) and (5.19b)), OPEC's utility
function is Bernoulli:
u* • log c* + log c*
(5.25)
2

1

In this case the solution in the presence of a government inventory
(Cases (i) and (iii)) involves

(5. 2 6)

5
0 1 - 14

i3

9

43

p1 - 14

4 83
02 - 7 84

a4

3

p2 - 7

84

A:3

a4

In addition,
(5.27J)

(5.27b)

U*

• log

c* + log c*
1

,.2

3
• log 9 + 21og 3 + 2log 28
7
2
a4

When there is no government inventory (case ii)) the solution
is exactly as that for example 1.

The reason is that, in this case,

-48the choice o.f P

has no implications for intertemporal substitution in OPEC.

1

Thus OPEC's utility is given by
'\,

*

A~
1
U • 2log -4 + 2log -a

(5.28)

4

while the USA's welfare·continues to be given by (5.19a)
Again, comparing (5. 27b) and (5. 28 ), note that OPEC has benefitted
because the US has pursued an inventory policy.
lost; (5.27a) is less than (5.19a).

The USA, however, has

The reason is that, when OPEC has
it is

diminishing marginal utility of consumption in period 2,

less willing to transfer consumption from period 2 to period 1 in response
to a US inventory policy.

It sets higher prices in both periods to
The US is consequently

maintain a

higher consumption level in period 2.

worse off.

In terms of Figure 1, when OPEC has a Bemoulli objective

function

are displaced up~ard relative to P1 • The loss
P* and P*
2

1
. in period 1 from having an inventory is consequently greater while the
gain in period 2 is less. Note also that here total imports over the two
periods have fallen because of the inventory policy.
f without a government inventory
Given that the USA is better Of

18 • O?

will it in fact se~

set Ig

If the US government does~

3a

Ig > O for all

P
1

< -

3

4- , given the

P as given it will set
1
structure of the remaining problem.

As in example 2 once

it is too late for the US to affect

P1 via its intentory policy.

taking

P1

is set

Consider a situation in which the US government announced that
lg• O.

it would establi~h
establish P1 •
establish

a3

2 .

I •

'\,

•3
3 a

OPEC will in fact set

If OPEC believed this announcement it would

then have an incentive to
The US govemment would
'\,
and drive
4

pl higher.

•3
P2 • 3 • Anticipating this behavior
In example 1 the USA nevertheless

benefitted from having a government inventory when OPEC adjusted

P1

in anticipation of period 1 inventory purchases.· An implication of
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h
th is exam ple and example 2 i
low er
s t at the US government can actu ally
US wel fare by dev elop ing th e cap acit y to lllai ntai n inv ento reis . The
s
abse nce of such a cap acit y con stit ute a cred ible commitment not to
stor e oil befo re OPEC esta blis hes
5.3

Con clus ion

teg ic sett ing ,
The se exam ples sug ges t tha t, in a stra
ntor y pol icy can have
of the US gov ernm ent to purs ue an inve
es, dep end ing upon both
des irab le and und esir able con sequ enc
ctu re of the proc ess
of OPEC's pref eren ces and upon the stru

the abi lity
both
the natu re
whereby

ent orie s.
OPEC sets pric es and the US sets inv
t of Sam uels on's (1972)
Our res ults can be inte rpre ted in ligh
iliz ing spe cula tion . Lik e
ana lysi s of the des irab ilit y of des tab
atio n in whi ch give n demand and
Samuel~on, we are con side ring a situ
iod s. Samuelson showed tha t in
sup ply con diti ons per sist for two per
in whi ch buy ers and sell ers behave
a com peti tive sett ing , tha t is, one
cula tor would rais e the wel fare of
as pric e tak ers, a des tab iliz ing spe
es wou ld exc eed the gain of the
both buy ers and sel lers . His own loss
Hen ce, in our exam ple, if the
oth er two grou ps com bine d, how ever .
ld be no pos itiv e role for a US
USA face d a com peti tive OPEC ther e wou
gov ernm ent would be acti ng as a
gov ernm ent inve ntor y pol icy . The US
to the res t of the wor ld, not jus t
des tab iliz ing spe cula tor. The gain
the cap ital loss the US government
to US con sum ers, would fal l sho rt of
to sel l in peri od 2.
would sus tain in buy ing in peri od 1

-so-

In facing a monop olistic seller , however, our examples indica te,
only
first of all, that a US government invent ory policy can raise not
US but world welfa re.

The reason is that the optim al US invent ory rule

makes US demand, on net, more elasti c over the two period s.

As a

sides
conseq uence the distor tion due to monopoly is dimini shed and both
can benef it.

More oil is consumed overa ll, so the world is moved closer

to the compe titive equili brium .
This result requir es that OPEC set pTice incorp oratin g the US
government respon se into its decisi on.

An implic ation is that

to

ses
succee d at raisin g US welfar e the US government invent ory purcha
should respon d

very closel y to actual oil prices ; i.e., the govern 

that are
ment should ,accor ding to our model, establ ish purcha sing rules
price contig ent.
A second implic ation of our examples is that,u nless the US
8
, it
government acts as a leader in settin g 1 before OPEC sets P1
US
may have an incent ive to establ ish a positi ve invent ory even when
.
welfar e is higher when there is a precommitment to no inven tories

The

orated
reason is that the loss to the USA from having an invent ory is incorp
it is
in the first period price. Once OPEC has establ ished this price
too late for the US government to avoid the undes irable conseq uences
of having an invent ory.

From that point on the benef its exceed the costs.
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6.

Other Arguments for Government Inven tories
Our analy sis has focus sed on conve nience yield s, uncer tainty
,

and strate gic intera ction s to expla in the existe nce of petrol
eum
reser ves.

Only in the third case did we find an argum ent for govern
ment

interv entio n.

Other econo mists have analy sed the case for a strate gic

l'eser ve and we discu ss their resul ts here.

Close st in spiri t to our own

analy sis is the paper by Maski n and Newbury (1978) which
exami nes the
possi ble effec t of US monopsony power on the optim al tarif
f respo nse.
Wrigh t and Willia ms (1982 ) have argue d that reserv es may
be justif ied as
a secon d best repon se to other (subo ptima l) ~overnment polic
ies, in
parti cular , price contr ols. Final ly, the stock pile has
been justif ied as
a means of reduc ing US vulne rabili ty to the threa t of an
embar go. Tolle y
and Wilman (1977) discu ss this issue .
6.1

U.S. Monopsony Power and Government Inven tories

Haski n and Newbury (1978 ) devel op a two-p eriod model in
which a
mono psoni stic U.S. faces a comp etitiv e set of oil produ
cers and other
buyer s.

The optim al open loop polic y is for the U.S. to estab lish
a

monopsony price (via an optim al tarif f, for instan ce) that
must be equal
(in disco unted terms ) acros s the two period s to extra ct
posit ive suppl ies
in the two perio ds. The two price s must be equal becau se
of Hotel ling's
formu la.

In the secon d perio d, howev er, the U.S. has an incen tive
to

devia te from the perio d 2 price that is optim al fromt he
open loop persp ec
tive. The reaso n is that the effec t of the perio d 2 price
on oil produ cers'
willin gness to hold oil in the groun d in perio d 1 is at
this point a bygone.
The price that is optim al from perio d 2's persp ective can
be highe r or lower
than that which was opti mal ~~• If oil produ cers and
other buyer s
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believe the announced open loop rule in making their period 1 decisions
about extraction the USA can benefit from renegging on the contract.

If,

however, the rest of the world anticipates the renegging the USA can
lose from its monopsony position.

If, say, the US government has an

incentive to revise the price downward in period 2 and individuals
correctly anticipate this revision, the period 1 price will be driven down
as well (again via the Hotelling rule).

The consequent equilibrium can be

worse from the US perspective than one in which the USA has no monopsony
power at all.

The USA would be best off if it could precommit itself to

its optimal open loop policy.

If this is not possible ·it could benefit by

somehow divesting itself of its monopsonv power in the second period.

Other

wise, the anticipatio n that the USA will excercize monopsony power in the

second period leads to behavior by other agents in the first period that
is detrimental to the USA.
In this context Maskin and Newbury show that the USA can benefit
from government ·storage in period 1 as a means of precommitti ng itself to
a course of action.

By buying stocks of oil the US government can

establish that it has an interest in maintaining the announced price of
oil in the second period when, in the absence of storage, it would want
to revise the second period price downward.

Haskin and Newbury find that

in a rational expectation s equilibrium the USA cannot

be hurt by a

US government stockpile while in some circumstanc es the USA will strictly
benefit.

The argument here is again in favor of a government inventory.

Pri,

agents do not have an incentive to invest in inventories as a means of making
the government' s optimal tariff commitment credible.
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6.2

Price Contro ls and Government lnvento ri~s
Wright and William s (1982) develop a model in which agents anticip ate

that in some periods (e.g., when the price is high) the government will
impose price contro ls on oil.

The private rate of return on storing oil

into these periods is conseq uently lower than . the social rate of return.
There is scope for

The private sector conseq uently stores too little.
additio nal governm ent reserve s.

Government storage here is a second best

respons e to other distort ionary government policie s.

The government does

ories
not actual ly have to impose price contro ls for a justifi cation for invent
.·

to emerge .

Private agents simply need to anticip ate that contro ls will

be applied with some probab ility.

Wright and William s do not attemp t to

model why the governm ent would impose contro ls and, hence, why it cannot
credibl y commit itself never to impose contro ls.
6.3

Vulner ability and Government Invent ories
The threat of a future embargo by OPEC can provide an additio nal

justifi cation for an invento ry.
this issue does not arise.

In a compe titive setting , of course ,

In the face of a monop olistic export er,

however, the supplie r could decide to curtai l supplie s at some moment.
A comple te modell ing of the embargo issue would require a specif ication
of the suppli er's motive s in imposin g an embarg o.
is that a

A real possib ility

governm ent invento ry is a means of preven ting an embargo.
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Tolle y and \Ulman

(1977) show that if a count ry is faced with

inven tories
an exogenous threa t of an embargo that a justi ficat ion for
er, only when
emerg es. There is scope for government interv entio n, howev
idual s would·
the embargo gener ates exter nal effec ts. Other wise, indiv
of inven tories
have an incen tive to maint ain the socia lly optim al level
d in sectio n 3.
thems elves in the face of an embargo threa t, as we showe
"•

a.

as a funct ion
They deriv e the optim al level of the government inven tory
exogenous likeli hood
of the exter natil ities gener ated by the embargo and the

and lengt h cf a poten tial embar20.
the
A more comp lete analy sis would speci fy (1) the natur e of
itsel f on
exter naliti es and (2) the effec t of the inven tory polic y
this sort could
the likeli hood and durat ion of an embargo. An analy sis of
It r£mai ns an
. be provid ed in a!l11lultiperiod game -theor etic frame work.
impor tant topic for futur e resea rch.

Riesman and Aiyag ari (1982)

rs. They
consi der the desir abili ty of the embargo polic y to the selle
ve the
find that only in a very speci al case can this polic y impro
selle r's posit ion from a purel y economic persp ectiv e.
The oil price shock s of the last decad e have spawned a large
litera ture on polic ies towar d oil.

There exist s a number of other

oil and/o r
artic les that have consi dered aspec ts of polic ies towar d
optim al stock pile behav ior.

Examples inclu de Nordhaus (1974 ), Calvo

erg (1981 ),
and Findl ay (1978 ), Gilbe rt (1978 ), Wright (1980 ), Teisb
and Roberds
Ulph and Folie (1981 ), Newbery (1981 ), and Epple , Hansen
(1 (}82).

7.

Conclusion
This paper investigate s the desirability of

US government

oil inventories in a two period, two country model in which the world
stock of oil is exhaustible .

We show that in competitive 11\8rkets

under certainty or uncertainty there is no welfare improving role for
public inventories

and, leaving aside operating stocks, a precautiona ry

demand for stocks of oil is due to the exclusion of internation al
insurance markets or property rights.
We show that only under a limited set of strategic games between
the USA and OPEC

can one justify public strategic petrolewn reserves.

Even then their desirabilit y depends upon the structure of preferences .

An inventory policy is inferior to one of imposing optimal tariffs
in the two periods.

But implementin g the optimal tariff may not

constitute a time consistent policy (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977):
while the USA could bring US welfare to a higher level by imposing optimal
tariffs in the two periods, the US may not have an incentive actually to
impose the tariff in the period in which it acts.
tariff

at the time OPEC sets price

A threat to impose the

may therefore not be credible.

An

SPR, while not raising US welfare to a level equal to that when optimal
tariffs are imposed, may nevertheles s raise welfare above that attainable by
other

time consistent policy.

an)

An inventory constitutes a second-best , but

credible, alternative to an optimal tariff policy.
In all our examples the government inventory makes a loss.

Consequentl y,

private, atomistic agents, acting as price takers, have no incentive to
hold any inventories at all.

Inventories serve the purpose of driving

down the price in the second period.
second period users.

The price is driven down for all

Any non-altruis tic individual considering investing

in an inventory will not take into account the effect of his own inventory
holding on lowering the price-for other US individua ls.
of a classic externali ty.
internali ze this effect.

The case is one

A US governmen t that maximizes US welfare will
Hence, in movin~ to a strategic settin~, a --

justifica tion for a governmen t SPR can be made.

As

its name implies,

strategic considera tion seem to have motivated the establishm ent of the
US SPR (see Senator Jackson's statement quoted in the introduct ion.)
Whether or not a US inventory enhances US welfare depends very
much upon the structure of decision makin~ in the US and OPEC, ann upon
the parameter s of the system.

We find three examples in which the

presence of an SPR reduces US welfare relative to a situation of zero
inventori es.

Neverthe less, once OPEC has acted, the USA may find it in

its interest to oursue an inventory policy.

Holding inventori es may then

cons~itut e a time consisten t policy that is inferior to a credible
precommit ment to hold zero inventori es.

Merely by developin ~ the capacity

to hold inventori es the SPR can reduce US welfare.
Another aspect of our analysis is to show that if OPEC invests
some of its first period income in US equities a credible, welfare
enhancing tariff policy on the part of the US can emerge.

We have not

considere d the interactio n between OPEC investmen t and US governmen t
inventori es here.

We consider this avenue as a promising one for

further research on the SPR.

One possibili ty is that, since US inventori es

raise OPEC's first period incane relative to its second period income,

that an inventory policy will increase OPEC's equity investmen t in the
USA.

For the reasons we discuss in section 3 and 4 this investmen t

acts further to reduce the second period price.

There is a second

channel, then, whereby a US governmen t purchase of inventori es in
period one can reduce the price of oil in period two.

FOOTNOTES
1 Nichols and Zeckhause r show that a stockpile can reduce US
welfare when the resource constrain t is binding.

In this context,

however, OPEC is not exercizin g monopoly power by restrictin g total
In fact, even when the resource constrain t is !!2.!_ binding the

supply.

inventory can reduce US welfare, as we show.
2For detailed descripti on of the SPR see Glatt (1982).

For

a discussio n of the quota system that prevailed during the period 1954-

1971 see Dam (1971).

Dam suggest that in 1969 tariff equivalen t of the

quota averaged about $1.25 per barrel.
3css Televisio n Network, Face The Nation, Sunday, July 18, 1982.
i,.

4
5

See Varian (1978].

aere we assume that capital cannot be consumed and therefore that

the interest rate is equal to the aarginal product of capital.
6

.

This uncertain ty could arise either from imperfect informa-

tion about the physical quantity of OPEC's oil or from uncertain ty about
OP!C's desire to aell oil to the USA.

The possibili ty of an embargo,

for emple, creates uncertain ty about OPEC's supply of oil to the USA.
To be consisten t with the analysis here the eii>argo aust be considere d

as a possibili ty that is exogenous to the USA'• behavior.

We discuss

this issue of an endogenous embargo in section 6.
7

U.S. Imports that year equalled -,re than one-third of

OPEC's Productio n.

See Table 1.
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8

Observe that

9

See Marion and

G • F1 and so
1
.

Sven■son

c12

•

r12 •

(19al ) for a coape titive 1110del

OPEC's
that deals vith the relati onshi p-bet ween the oil price and
inves taent s.

lO'l'his resul t is remin iscen t of the vell-k nown Metzl er
parad ox.

Here it

ari ■ es becau■ e

of the inter actio n betwe en the

price of oil and the retur n on capit al.

11
Note that it is

a ■suaed

here that

I\,

*
It

>

8
19 , 3

.
17 •·
4

12'1'his alloc ation (ca•e (i)) ia opti ul ■ ubject to the parti cular
rules of the game that ve ••sumed for the US and OPEC •

•
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